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Recent research disputes the conventional wisdom that “sanctions do not work,” demon-
strating that sanctions may be intended for purposes beyond an immediate change in
the behavior of targeted states. This contention is supported by the argument that
democratic leaders often impose sanctions because their domestic constituency sup-
ports them. However, the specific consequences of proposed sanctions that citizens
support or oppose are not well understood. Utilizing the insights of prior studies on
the use and consequences of sanctions, we assemble theoretical expectations regarding
favored and disfavored aspects of sanctions. We design and conduct a survey experi-
ment to explore degrees of support for proposed sanctions following from variation in
several specific expected consequences thereof. Our results provide insight into why this
seemingly ineffective policy tool is so common: on average, citizens support proposed
sanctions that are expected to have a long-run impact on target behavior.
∗Note: author names are listed in alphabetical order. We are grateful for comments from participants at
the Kobe Sakura Meeting 2015 (Kobe University, Japan), in particular from Mwita Chacha, Graeme Davis,
Rob Johns, and Jason Reifler. We also wish to thank Max Hilbig for help executing the survey experiment.
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Introduction
According to the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a government
entity that oversees economic sanctions, the United States maintains 28 distinct sanctions
programs restricting commerce with over 50 countries as of September 2015.1 The imposition
of sanctions against Russia in 2014 over its intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea,
along with the spirited public debate this policy precipitated in the United States, bring
into focus the continued relevance of this commonly-used foreign policy tool. Indeed, this
attention is warranted because sanctions often appear, at least at first glance, to be counter-
productive, rarely extracting concessions from sanctioned (target) states (e.g., Pape 1997;
Hufbauer et al. 2007), and yet causing suffering among the most vulnerable affected citizens
(e.g., Weiss 1999; Allen and Lektzian 2013).
Notably, recent research disputes the scholarly conventional wisdom that sanctions “do
not work,” suggesting that scholars have focused too narrowly on short-run policy concessions
as the sole determinant of effectiveness (Baldwin 1999). Indeed, one simple explanation for
the pervasiveness of sanctions is that foreign policy-makers, who are responsive to public
opinion (e.g., Holsti 1992, 2004; Baum and Potter 2008), use economic coercion to satisfy
public demand for action amid an international crisis (Whang 2011). However, the specific
consequences of proposed sanctions that citizens support or oppose are not well understood.
In this paper, we synthesize previous studies that examine the decision to use sanctions
and the consequences thereof, isolating potential outcomes of sanctions that citizens could
like or dislike. Building from this prior research, we design and conduct a novel survey exper-
iment that allows us to vary the characteristics of proposed sanctions in order to determine
how a variety of sanction consequences affect citizen support. Survey participants from the
1In some instances, states are targeted solely due to the residence of sanctioned individuals
or organizations on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.
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United States, recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), read vignettes describing
hypothetical cases of armed aggression and human rights crackdowns that occur abroad, and
then rate their support for the proposed U.S. response. By comparing support for combi-
nations of proposed sanction consequences, we identify whether and how much features of
such an episode affect citizens’ satisfaction with the policy. Our most notable finding is that
the perception of a greater long-run effect deterring the target from repeating a proscribed
action leads to substantially higher support for sanctions.
This paper has important implications for theory and policy. Our findings shed light on
possible reasons why citizens could support sanctions despite that the policy fails generally
to extract immediate concessions from targets. Our study is, to our knowledge, the first to
gauge public opinion on sanctions using a survey experiment. Simple polls of public opinion
are limited by the complex policy environment, wherein the particularities of each case
are bound to obscure generalized causal relationships. Our survey experiment is designed
to overcome this limitation. Our findings are particularly relevant for policy-makers from
democratic countries, who often face pressure to act following major events and crises around
the world, despite the fact that their interests appear affected only marginally, if at all. Our
findings also raise a number of questions to motivate future researchers, who can expand upon
our research design to isolate additional contextual factors that influence citizen support for
sanctions, and who can examine the determinants of support for sanctions relative to other
foreign policy tools.
Beyond the Conventional Wisdom that Sanctions “Do
Not Work”
Academic study has long demonstrated that sanctions are not effective at extracting policy
concessions from targeted states (e.g., Pape 1997), and yet their use has increased over time
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(Morgan et al. 2014:546-547). One possible explanation for the frequent use of a seemingly
impotent foreign policy tool is that sanctions could be more effective than the scholarly
conventional wisdom dictates, potentially because targets willing to acquiesce tend to do so
before sanctions are imposed (e.g., Drezner 2003).2 Alternatively, political leaders could be
motivated to use sanctions for reasons beyond desire to change target policy. For example,
decision-makers could value the costs that sanctions impose on targets (e.g., Marinov 2005;
Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Peterson and Drury 2011), and the associated signal they
could send to third parties considering similar behavior (e.g., Galtung 1967; Lindsay 1986;
Peterson 2013, 2014).3
A simple but powerful explanation of sanction use, particularly by democracies, is that
this foreign policy tool satisfies public demand that leaders “do something” amid an inter-
national crisis (Whang 2011). Indeed, previous research on public opinion and foreign policy
holds critical implications that could explain why citizen preferences could drive the use
of sanctions. First, there has been movement away from the Almond-Lippmann consensus
that public opinion is inconsistent and largely irrelevant for foreign policy (Almond 1950;
Lippmann 1955). More recent studies demonstrate that leaders are responsive to citizen pref-
erences on foreign policy (Holsti 1992, 2004; Baum and Potter 2008; Canes-Wrone 2015),
and that citizen attitudes are actually more consistent than thought previously (Verba et al.
1967; Mueller 1973). Indeed, research finds that public opinion on foreign policy tends to be
“pretty prudent” (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998), favoring action to promote
the so-called national interest, but hesitating to risk lives with interventionist policy absent
2Research also finds that the circumstances of a given case produce great variation in sanction
success (see Bapat et al. 2013).
3Indeed, research suggests that scholars have adopted a definition of “success” that is too
strict, ignoring gradations in sanctions effectiveness that could appeal to policy-makers
(Elliott 1998:see also Baldwin 1999).
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an imminent security threat (see also Mueller 1973). Furthermore, people (in the United
States) tend to develop foreign policy preferences around moral guidelines, favoring action
to foster democracy and human rights, while discouraging repression and conflict; yet this
morality is tempered by practical concern for the policy’s feasibility and costliness (Steel
1999).
Public opinion is likely to play a role in sanctions policy, and yet we know little regard-
ing how the public views the features and consequences of sanctions.4 Indeed, the common
view of sanctions as counterproductive could follow from focus on consequences of sanctions
other than those that matter to policy makers or the public to which they are responsive.
As previous studies show, sanctions have a variety of effects, some of which citizens might
support, some of which could evoke indifference, and some of which could provoke opposi-
tion to the policy. However, the potential sensitivity of public opinion to specific sanction
characteristics remains only speculation, as the reasons why citizens support sanctions have
not been studied in detail.
Our goal in this paper is to uncover the specific consequences of sanctions that affect
citizen support for the policy. We begin with the assumption that democratic leaders craft
foreign policy to satisfy public opinion. Leaders and citizens alike face tradeoffs over the use
of sanctions. Leaders desire the appearance of efficacy to maintain their office, most likely
achieved in a democratic state via the provision of public goods (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2004). Sanctions could provide public goods in the form of policy concessions from
the target and/or the perception by citizens that their state has successfully transmitted a
4If sanctions are used to satisfy public demand for action, then it follows that sanctions
are more likely to occur when the public becomes aware of bad behavior by a foreign state.
Indeed, research finds that greater attention to human rights abuse by the media encourages
the use of sanctions against abusive governments (Nielsen 2013; Peksen et al. 2014).
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message that it is resolved to punish misbehavior.5 However, given that political leaders
face many diverse demands and hold limited resources, they also value cost-effectiveness.
Because the achievement of costly foreign policy goals would likely entail distributing costs
to the public, democratic leaders should be wary of engaging in these actions unless they
perceive that the public is willing to bear the costs.
In light of findings by previous research on sanctions, we contend that there are (at
least) four positive consequences of sanctions that citizens might support. First, and most
intuitively, citizens should be more likely to support sanctions that convince or compel the
target to reverse the policy that prompted international disapproval. The seeming inability
of sanctions to achieve short-run policy concessions has received the most scholarly attention
(e.g., Galtung 1967; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Hufbauer et al. 2007). Second, despite
this scholarly focus on policy concessions, previous research also considers other sanction
goals and consequences. Indeed, Galtung (1967:379), acknowledging the moral determinants
of foreign policy preferences, suggests that punishment of the target is a primary goal of
sanctions, typically as important as obtained policy concessions. Although it is reasonable
to assume that the harm inflicted by sanctions is a means towards the end of achieving
policy concessions, it is also possible that citizens approve of punishment for its own sake.
Accordingly, following from previous research evaluating the extent to which sanctions could
harm target economies and leaders (e.g., Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Marinov 2005; Es-
cribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Peterson and Drury 2011; Whang et al. 2013), we focus on
target costs as a potential consequence of sanctions that citizens might support.
Furthermore, we study the consequences of sanctions beyond their direct, immediate
5Not all sanctions are best viewed as policy of public goods provision. For example, many
sanction cases arise over the issue of trade, such that victory would provide tangible, exclu-
sive benefits to some company or industry. However, the potential consequences of sanctions
in the scenarios we develop do have a public goods character.
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effects. For example, despite the fact that tough sanctions enacted against Russia over
its invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea are unlikely to force Russia to retreat
from Crimea, the costs incurred could convince Russian leaders to be less aggressive (or
at least less openly so) in similar future disputes (Drezner 2014). Accordingly, the third
consequence of sanctions on which we focus is long-run policy concessions. Similarly, classic
research suggests the possibility that sanctions could have reputation effects, convincing
third parties that the sender is willing to punish misbehavior (Galtung 1967; Baldwin 1985;
Lindsay 1986). Recent research provides evidence that states do incorporate the information
conveyed by sanctions against a third party, rendering them more likely to acquiesce to an
explicit sanction threat (Peterson 2013), and, in some cases, quicker to change proscribed
policy proactively, before being targeted with sanctions (Peterson 2014). As such, the fourth
positive sanction characteristic we examine is third-party deterrence.
There are (at least) two additional considerations that could inform citizen support for
the policy. Sanctions are by design costly to the sender as well as the target. We expect
that citizens consider each of the four positive sanction effects discussed above along with
the costs such action would entail for the domestic economy. Thus, we focus on an indi-
vidual’s response to variation in lost jobs, arguably the most salient manifestation of these
costs, to gauge the magnitude of dissatisfaction with a sanction following from its domestic
cost. Finally, we consider the possibility that a citizen’s support for sanctions depends on
whether she perceives that the target is an international threat. Therefore, we vary the issue,
specifically examining the difference in support for sanctions in the aftermath of internal vs.
external aggression. Internal aggression, such as a human rights crackdown, could promote
international anger, but is unlikely to invoke the perception of a security threat among cit-
izens outside the state experiencing a crisis. Conversely, we contend that citizens are more
likely to perceive a security threat (albeit not a direct threat) when witnessing aggression
by a potential sanction target against a neighboring state.
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To summarize the discussion above, we expect citizen support to sanctions to follow as
a function of positive and negative consequences thereof, as well as the issue at hand. Our
six expectations follow below:
1. A higher probability of short-run policy concessions leads to higher support for proposed
sanctions.
2. Higher target costs lead to higher support for sanctions.
3. A higher probability of long-run policy concessions leads to higher support for proposed
sanctions.
4. The presence of third-party deterrent effects leads to higher support for proposed sanc-
tions.
5. Greater job losses lead to lower support for proposed sanctions
6. The issue of foreign aggression leads to higher support for proposed sanctions than does
the issue of human rights abuse.
One might conclude that we can understand citizen views on proposed sanctions, and
thus understand why sanctions are used, by leveraging public opinion polls. Although many
such polls have assessed support for the use of sanctions (along with a wide variety of other
foreign policy tools), the nature of polls renders this seemingly abundant source of knowledge
critically limited in its ability to identify why citizens support or oppose a given policy option.
For example, the Roper Center Public Opinion Archives contain numerous records dating
back to 1977 of polls by various organizations regarding the question of whether to lift the
United States’ embargo against Cuba. Although inconsistencies in question wording over
time obscure the identification of a trend, the general pattern shows increasing support
over time for ending these sanctions.6 Assuming this trend existed, it would nonetheless be
difficult to isolate the factors that are responsible. One intriguing possibility is that Cuba’s
6Although question wording varies somewhat over time and across polling organizations,
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continued defiance over time betrays the ineffectiveness of the policy, leading practically-
minded citizens to prefer ending it. However, it is possible instead that this trend follows
from the emergence of a new generation of voting-age citizens who were not yet born during
the mass panic of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and thus do not perceive Cuba’s communist
regime as a major threat.
Similarly, survey responses fail to capture context following from variation over time and
space in the public’s frame of reference when considering a particular foreign policy option.
For example, during the public debate leading up to U.S. sanctions against Russia over its
intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, a number of polling organizations gauged
support for sanctions in isolation (see, e.g., Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
2015), failing to account for the fact that some respondents might see the alternative as doing
nothing, while others might see sanctions as a means to avoid committing to costly military
action. Other polls asked citizens also to indicate support for military intervention, aid
to Ukraine’s government, and for “staying out of it altogether” (Reason Foundation 2014).7
However, even these polls are limited given that the policies could be, but are not necessarily,
considered mutually exclusive by respondents. Perhaps more importantly, survey questions
tend to reflect the currently salient policy debate, possibly capturing the particularity of a
given event or crisis, thereby limiting comparability across cases, over time. While surveys
can be useful to determine whether divisions in public opinion exist with respect to party
identification, state of residence, gender, etc., they are not able to identify the causes of
the survey question typically follows the pattern illustrated by this question asked by the
Associated Press on January 29, 2015: “Do you think the United States should remove
its embargo against trade with Cuba, or keep that embargo in place?” (Associated Press
2015).
7The Reason Foundation is a partisan (libertarian) source, but the poll referenced here was
scientific.
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support in specific cases with multiple features and consequences. A survey experiment is
necessary to preclude potential bias.
Research Design
To gauge whether empirical evidence supports our expectations, we design, carry out, and
analyze a survey experiment. Survey experiments have been used increasingly often to
investigate key questions in international relations, overcoming the limitations of traditional
survey methods.8 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first such survey experiment to
study citizen preferences on economic sanctions. We rely on a conjoint design which allows
us to construct hypothetical scenarios that hold contextual factors constant while varying
the characteristics (e.g., issue) and expected consequences (e.g., sanction costs, short-run
policy concessions, etc.) of proposed sanctions. This design allows us simultaneously to
test multiple hypotheses, isolating and comparing the causal effects of various expected
sanction consequences on citizens’ support for the proposed policy, thereby attaining a more
comprehensive understanding of citizens’ attitudes towards sanctions (Hainmueller et al.
2014).9 Below, we provide details on our survey design, variable codings, sample recruitment,
and statistical analysis.
8For examples, Tomz (2007) and Chaudoin (2014) investigate the micro-foundation of audi-
ence costs theories; Tomz and Weeks (2013) examine the causes of the democratic-peace.
An entire issue of International Interactions was devoted to this topic (Jensen et al. 2014).
For an overview, see Hyde (2015).
9Hainmueller et al. (2014:10) call this the average marginal component effect. Specifically,
it is “the marginal effect of attribute l averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining




Figure 1: An example screen of the survey experiment
After viewing a brief instruction for the exercise,10 respondents, who were recruited within
the United States, are shown a screen as displayed in Figure 1. On each such screen, we
provide information about the target country, the issue at hand, the proposed policy by
the United States government, and its short- and long-run consequences. We randomly
10The instruction is as follows: “[i]n the following three screens, you will find a short descrip-
tion of a political scenario and a hypothetical policy that the United States government is
proposing. Please read each very carefully and then evaluate the proposed policy.”
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vary sanction policy profiles on seven dimensions, including Issue, Target Costs, Lost Jobs,
Short-run Policy Concessions, Long-run Policy Concessions, and Third-party Deterrence.
The first dimension we vary is the issue in dispute. In particular, we focus on two issues:
human rights abuse against a minority group inside the target country, or a target invasion
into a neighboring country. These two issues allow us to capture differences in response to
internal versus external aggression. As noted above, this difference could provoke differing
perceptions of security threat, thus allowing us to examine whether citizens support sanc-
tions more or less when they seek to mitigate (indirect) threats from abroad. When the
underlying issue is about human rights, respondents are told:
A country cracks down harshly on a religious and ethnic minority.
The United States has longstanding political and economic ties to the
region, but no direct security partnership.
This issue summary emphasizes the violent nature of the country’s actions, but also high-
lights that the United States faces no threat to its security from the action. For the issue of
invasion, respondents are told:
A country invades the border region of one of its neighboring countries,
claiming that the neighbor country opposes a minority to which the
invader has close ties. It is widely expected that this country plans on
carrying out similar incursions against at least two additional neigh-
bors. The United States has longstanding political and economic ties
to the region, but no direct security partnership.
In this case, we portray the country as an aggressor not against its people, but rather to a
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neighboring country, further suggesting that it is potentially threatening to additional states.
We are careful not to imply that that the state is threatening conflict against the United
States directly, merely that it could be an international security threat. This design choice
is motivated by the reality that the United States (like many common users of sanctions)
faces primarily indirect security threats from destabilizing international conflict.
After describing the issue at hand, we inform respondents about the proposed policy
response by the U.S. government and its consequences for the U.S. economy, the target,
and (possibly) third-party states. First, to identify the sensitivity of opinions to sanction
costs, we randomly vary the extent of the sanctions’ potential harm to the U.S. economy as
expressed in the expected number of lost jobs. The values for the costs to the U.S. economy
closely mirror the figures found in academic and policy debates.11 More specifically, respon-
dents are told:
The U.S. government imposes [Extent ] economic sanctions on the hu-
man rights-abusing country. Credible estimates predict that the sanc-
tions will lead immediately to [Lost Jobs ] jobs lost in the United States.
where Extent ∈ {very minor, mild, moderate, extensive, comprehensive} and Lost Jobs ∈
{100, 300, 500, 700, 900, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000, 7000, 8000, 9000, 10000,
15000, 25000, 35000, 45000, 55000}. Adjectives describing the extent of sanctions are drawn
corresponding to the number of lost jobs.
To examine the willingness to punish target misbehavior, we also vary the expected harm
11For example, Hufbauer et al. (1997) estimates that a total of 26 U.S. unilateral sanctions
caused 200,000 to 260,000 lost jobs within the United States in 1995, which they regard as
“a relatively high cost” to the U.S. economy. Following this, we treat 10,000 lost jobs per
sanction as a moderately high cost.
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to the target’s economy. Informed by the scholarly literature on sanction effectiveness, we
use one of three randomly chosen adjectives. In particular, we tell respondents:
Experts also predict that, until the country abandons its aggressive
policy, the sanctions will cause [Target Costs ] economic harm to the
human rights-abusing country
where Target Costs ∈ {imperceptible, moderate, severe}. This set of adjectives allows us to
examine the desire to see the target punished and hurt, perhaps irrespective of the effect of
sanctions on the target’s behavior.
Scholarly and policy debates focus considerable attention to how sanctions affect target
behavior. However, we know little about whether people actually care about these direct
effects of sanctions on the target. Accordingly, we consider both short-run and long-run
potential policy concessions by the target. For the short-run effects of proposed sanctions,
respondents are told:
Experts agree on predictions that sanctions will make [Short-run Ef-
fect ] progress towards coercing the country to stop the human rights
abuses
where Short-run Effect ∈ {imperceptible, little, some, meaningful}.
We also randomize how likely the proposed sanctions are to change the behavior of the
target in the long run. Further, we vary the source of predictions for the long-term effect,
given that people might not trust estimates made by the U.S. government, which faces in-
centives to inflate prospects for long-term success.12 We suspect that if the estimates are
12The U.S. government has been shown to influence informational sources; see Qian and
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shared and supported by other sources, such as foreign governments and non-partisan think
tanks, respondents could show greater support (Chapman 2009).13 We tell respondents:
[Source] predict that the proposed sanctions will [Long-run Effect ]
deter the country from further human rights abuses in the future
where Source ∈ {U.S. government officials, U.S. government officials and non-partisan think
tank experts} and Long-run Effect ∈ {not likely, possibly, probably, certainly}.14
Additionally, we investigate whether potential reputation effects influence respondents’
support for sanctions. Specifically, we randomly insert the following extra sentence after the
description of long-run consequences:
Additionally, they expect that the imposition of sanctions could con-
Yanagizawa (2009) and Dreher et al. (2008).
13Figure A.5 in the Web Appendix presents the results of tests examining whether informa-
tion source conditions the impact of our primary treatments. Essentially, the results are
substantively unchanged.
14We are aware of the fact that, because we do not use identical adjectives to determine
support for short-run and long-run effectiveness, we cannot easily compare their relative
effects on respondent support for sanctions. We make this design choice purposefully, given
that the short-run impact of sanctions is well understood to be modest at best; thus, it
is not particularly interesting to examine support for some idealized case where sanctions
lead immediately to acquiescence. We contend that it is relatively more important to use
realistic terms when describing sanction characteristics.
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vince other potential aggressors not to initiate crackdowns of their
own.
After reading about the background information and proposed sanction policy, survey-
takers are asked to report “whether [they] oppose or support the proposed policy” using a
9-point scale as illustrated in Figure 1.
Subject Recruitment
Respondents were hired via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online platform to re-
cruit and pay subjects to undertake tasks. In recent years, MTurk has become a popular tool
for social scientists to conduct survey experiments. The biggest advantage of using MTurk
is its relatively low cost. In addition, the self-selection of participants could actually reduce
measurement error and increase the quality of data relative to a nationally representative
sample for a given survey task (Kertzer et al. 2014).15
Although one might suspect MTurk samples to suffer from limited external validity stem-
ming from a lack of representativeness, previous research suggests that this concern generally
is unwarranted. For example, Berinsky et al. (2012) show that MTurk samples are more
representative than convenience samples typically used in experiments in political science.
Furthermore, the authors replicate existing studies using MTurk, finding results consistent
with those produced by other sampling methods. In the case of our experiment, there is no
clear a priori expectation that some feature(s) of our MTurk sample might condition our
treatment effects (Druckman and Kam 2011). Nonetheless, we use a variety of techniques to
15Recent evidence suggests that, counter to their reputation for inattentiveness, MTurk work-
ers are more attentive than undergraduate students and have become more so over time
(Hauser and Schwarz 2015:6-7). Nonetheless, we also check respondents’ attentiveness
by including a screener and requiring respondents to demonstrate that they are paying
attention to the instructions (Berinsky et al. 2014) (see the Web Appendix).
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address concerns for representativeness. First, as discussed below, we use sample weights to
match our demographic variables to those of the general population (Hainmueller 2012). In
the Web Appendix, we present models using a more complex weighting scheme.16 Second,
in Web Appendix, we replicate our main analysis on subsamples stratified by education and
ideology; all results are substantively similar.
We recruited survey respondents in January 2015. All respondents were self-reported
U.S. residents and were paid between $0.75 and $ 1.00. After accepting the task on MTurk,
participants were directed to an author’s website to take the survey.17 Each subject evaluated
three hypothetical cases.18 A total of 1,738 subjects participated in the survey experiment;
16Beyond concern for unrepresentativeness with respect to broad demographic categories, one
might question whether members of a given group on MTurk are qualitatively distinct from
the broader group within the general population. For example, perhaps self-identified U.S.
conservatives on MTurk might not look like conservatives in the broader U.S. population.
However, previous research finds no evidence of this problem; specifically, Grimmer et al.
(2012) find that liberals and conservatives on MTurk respond to common survey questions
similarly to liberals and conservatives, respectively, on the American National Election
Survey.
17Respondents participated in two more experiments embedded in the same survey. Because
this experiment was included before the other two, we are not concerned about possible
effects that treatments in the other experiments might have on the respondents’ opinions
in this experiment.
18As we pool respondents’ ratings across the three cases, one concern is that treatments
given to a respondent in one case might affect the rating in other cases. We check for
these possible carryover effects (Hainmueller et al. 2014:22-25), in section D of the Web
Appendix. We find little evidence that our pooling generates significant distortions due to
carryover effects.
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accordingly, we obtained 1,738 × 3 = 5,214 observations.19
Statistical Analysis
To estimate the causal effects of each component (i.e. sanction consequences), we regress
each respondents’ support ratings on the logarithm of lost jobs and dummy variables for
the values of target costs, short- and long-run policy concessions, the underlying issue, in-
formation sources, and the potential for a third-party deterrence effect (using the lowest
value as the omitted category for each).20 Further, we account for intra-subject correlation
by using cluster-bootstrapped standard errors (Harden 2011). Finally, while randomization
guarantees internally valid treatment effects, these may not be representative of effects in the
population if treatment effect heterogeneity exists and if our MTurk sample is different from
the population. We are confident that our sample does not reflect the population (Berinsky
et al. 2012; Huff and Tingley 2014), but treatment effect heterogeneity is uncertain. To
address this issue, we include in the survey several questions regarding demographics (age,
gender, and a 7-point self-evaluation on the Republican-Democratic ideological spectrum),
19We drop a small number of observations because they failed our screener more than twice
or took excessively much (more than 1,000 seconds for three evaluations) or little (below
50 seconds) time to answer the questions. These corrections result in a loss of 2.6% of the
observations, such that we retain 5,076 observations from 1,692 respondents.
20Importantly, this modeling approach makes the assumption that a citizen’s overall support
is an additive function of each treatment’s effect, and is linear in the logarithm of job loss.
We think that this assumption is justified for an initial analysis such as this one. How-
ever, many of the robustness check models presented in the appendix present the results
of models subset in various ways, allowing us to address some potential for multiplica-
tive conditionality. We find little substantive evidence for concerns stemming from this
possibility.
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which we took from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) (Vavreck
and Rivers 2008). By re-weighting our MTurk sample, we match these demographic vari-
ables to the population moments of the CCES (Hainmueller 2012), thereby improving our
confidence that our estimates correspond to effects in the population (Hainmueller et al.
2015).21
Results
The coefficients from our main model, which are the average component effects, are reported
in Table 1 in the Web Appendix. To understand substantive effects, we simulate effects
via the parametric bootstrap (King et al. 2000). Figure 2 presents the estimated effect of
each sanctions aspect on public support. The dots represent the median estimated marginal
or incremental effect of each sanction dimension on the support rating; the horizontal lines
indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dots without horizontal lines represent the reference
categories for a given dimension, to which each effect should be compared.
Our results show that public preferences on economic sanctions are complex; people care
about several consequences of sanctions, some of which are surprising. Figure 2 identifies
two consequences of economic sanctions as main concerns for the respondents: the costs
of sanctions to the U.S. economy (in terms of lost jobs), and long-term policy concessions
by the target. Three other consequences are of modest importance: target costs, short-run
policy concessions, and third-party deterrent effects. First, we estimate that an increase in
the number of potential lost jobs from the minimum (100) to a “moderate high” (10,000)
decreases public support by about 0.9 on a 9-point scale, roughly 40 percent of the standard
21Furthermore, in section C of the Web Appendix, we present additional models that exam-
ine whether our main findings are conditional on possibly relevant demographic factors.
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Effect on Support for Economic Sanctions
Figure 2: Consequences of Sanctions and Public Support. Dots signify median esti-
mates, and bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Dots without bars represent the reference
category for a given attribute.
deviation of the support variable. This strong sensitivity to potential lost jobs is consistent
with the argument that costs are salient to citizens.
Public support also depends crucially on the potential long-run effect of sanctions; re-
spondents care about the implications of sanction efforts for the future behavior of the target.
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Increasing the likelihood of deterring repeated bad behavior by the target from“not likely” to
“probable” or “certain” leads to an increase in respondent support of about 1.2 on a 9-point
scale, an increase corresponding to 50 percent of the standard deviation for support. Al-
though directly comparing this result to that of other sanctions consequences should be done
cautiously, it is noteworthy that this long-run effect appears to fare well relative to other
sanction consequences. Perhaps more remarkable is that this finding is robust across differ-
ent models and subsets of the sample while the effects of other consequences can sometimes
be less pronounced (see the Web Appendix for details).
We find some support for the expectation that short-run policy concessions increase sup-
port for sanctions. When the extent of progress made by the sanction toward changing the
target’s misbehavior alters from “imperceptible” to “meaningful,” public support increases
by about 0.6, roughly 20 percent of the standard deviation of the support variable.This find-
ing is not surprising given that most academic debates over sanctions focus on their short-run
effects–i.e., whether they cause immediate change in the target’s offensive behavior. Indeed,
one would expect, a priori, that immediate concessions should be the primary drivers of
support for sanctions. The lack of a stronger finding for this treatment could stem from
respondents’ preexisting beliefs that sanctions are ineffective in the short run. Alternately,
this modest finding could follow because we do not use an adjective stronger than “mean-
ingful.” However, given the conventional wisdom that sanctions “do not work,” we reiterate
that the use of a stronger adjective such as “complete” or “total” would result in unrealistic
and thus uninteresting variants of our scenarios.
The results also indicate that public support is sensitive to target costs and third-party
deterrence, but these effects are relatively small in magnitude, similar to that for short-run
policy concessions. First, an increase from low to high target costs leads to an increase in
support by at most 0.5. Similarly, the suggestion that sanctions could deter a third party
from engaging in similar bad behavior leads to a small, yet statistically significant increase in
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support equal to approximately 0.33. Finally, contrary to our expectations, public support
does not appear to depend much on the issue, at least independently. In the Web Appendix,
we condition the impact of other treatments on the issue at stake, finding few differences.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper offers the first analysis of citizens’ preferences on economic sanctions in a way
that overcomes the limitations of public opinion polls. The findings from our survey ex-
periment show that people are particularly concerned about sanctions’ long-run impacts on
target behavior. Their support for a sanction becomes particularly strong when it is ex-
pected to compel the target state not to engage in aggressive behavior in the future. Their
support depends less on how much sanctions are expected generate immediate target policy
concessions. These findings provide a powerful explanation for the old puzzle of why states
continue to use sanctions despite their limited effectiveness. Our findings suggests that we
may observe many “ineffective” sanctions because leaders do not use them to change an of-
fending behavior, but rather to deter repetition of such behavior in the future. However, our
results demonstrate only that citizens would like this outcome. It would be quite difficult
to isolate whether, and under what conditions, this long-run impact of sanctions occurs in
reality. Yet future research would benefit from the attempt, given that future restraint by
sanctioned states could prevent considerable suffering among citizens subject to internal and
international aggression.
Although it is useful as a first step to examine levels of support for sanctions in isolation,
we hope future research can build from our findings to explore the factors that determine
preferences among multiple foreign policy options. One fruitful line of inquiry would examine
the factors that make the public prefer carrots to sticks, or prefer more costly (in terms of
lives as well as dollars) military action as an alternative to economic coercion. While we find
22
that preferences for long-run effectiveness are especially influential with respect to support for
sanctions, desire for short-run results might drive preference for militarized foreign policies.
Additionally, future research can improve our understanding of the contextual factors
influencing support for sanctions. For example, people could be less supportive of coercion
against allies, or against target states viewed favorably (see Tomz and Weeks 2013: for a
similar argument regarding support of military strikes). Finally, future research can relax
our assumption that support is a function of an additive process regarding expected positive
and negative aspects of sanctions. For example, support associated with long-term policy
concessions or third-party deterrence effects could be entirely conditional on the domestic
costs of sanctions being low.
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